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Abstract
In light of growing critique of human rights and human rights 
education, this article explores ontologies of human rights, the 
possibilities they present for dissensus and how this could influence 
human rights education in post-conflict education contexts towards 
reconciliation. We draw on Dembour’s (2010) categorisation of the 
different schools of human rights and Ranciere’s (2004) two forms 
of rights to explore possible constructing points of dissensus. The 
data obtained in a NRF funded project Human rights literacy: A 
quest for meaning (Roux, 2012), indicate that student-teachers are 
disillusioned by human rights and perceive a conflict between what 
human rights are (contextual) and could (idealistic) be. While we 
concur with Keet (2015) that there is a need for “Critical Human 
Rights Education” (Keet, 2015) we focus on human action and 
the structuring of dissensus within political, social and educational 
spaces as crucial to the continual formulation, claims, rejection, 
amendments and recognition of human rights. In conclusion, we 
pose that human rights education should be a continual dissonant 
process, enabling moments of dissensus within intersecting spaces 
of (non)existing rights.
Keywords: action, dissensus, human rights, human rights edu­
cation, ontology, post-conflict education contexts, reconciliation
1. Introduction
During the last two decades, human rights education 
(hereafter HRE) has become an integral part of international 
discourses on education policy (Baja, 2011). The Member 
States of the Council of Europe define HRE as educational 
programmes and activities promoting equality in dignity in 
conjunction with intercultural learning and empowering 
minorities. Mihr (2015: 535) describes HRE as a “concept 
based on acknowledgement, awareness, empathy, em­
power ment, and the actions of people to change a current 
situation in accordance with human rights values, norms and 
standards”. The link between human rights and education 
is stipulated in the preamble of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948; hereafter UDHR). The UDHR 
(1948) also serves as the blueprint for HRE curricula and 
pedagogical texts (Keet, 2015). In recent years, however it 
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has become clear that the field of HRE is conceptually imprisoned, unproductive, conforms to 
declarationism and is uncritical (Keet, 2012; Keet, 2015; Zembylas, 2016). Human rights and 
HRE have lost their dissident and rebellious spirit (Kapur, 2006)
In line with the global and local focus on HRE and human rights in education, South Africa 
has based its post­apartheid curricula on the premise of the Constitution of South Africa 
and the Bill of Rights (1996). The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy and 
the Bill of Responsibilities for the Youth of South Africa, which were published in 2011, 
emphasise the rights and responsibilities relating to equality, human dignity, education, 
social justice and equity as well as non­racism and non­sexism, respect and reconciliation 
(Verster, 2014). Data from the NRF funded project Human rights literacy: A quest for 
meaning (Roux, 2012) indicate that despite the availability of multiple policy documents 
on HRE and human rights in education, student­teachers lack knowledge of human rights 
and many seemed to be disillusioned to the possibilities of human rights and HRE to 
bring about reconciliation and social change. Although reconciliation carries assumptions 
of restoration, harmonisation, coexistence and of going back to pre­existing relations 
(Krog, 1998), within South African contexts, this is impossible. South Africans need 
a­new conciliation within a constitutional democracy premised on human rights values. 
If, however, as Keet (2015: 47) argues, HRE accepts that “things are what they are” and 
through this acceptance normalises inequalities and other human rights violations, it has 
lost any emancipatory and transformative capabilities to renew the South African society.
In light of recent critique of human rights, HRE and student­teachers’ responses to the 
questions in the survey used to collect data for the project referred to above, this article 
explores ontologies of human rights, the possibilities they present for dissensus (Ranciere, 
2004) and how this could influence HRE in post-conflict education contexts. The responses 
cited below imply that the student teachers concerned perceive two conflicting sides to the 
nature of human rights: an idealistic expectation and a contextual reality. They see these as 
fixed and static and in direct opposition to each other: 
Are you questioning the REALITY/CONTEXTUAL [emphasis original text] nature of 
human rights or the idealistic nature hereof? (SurveyQ74)
In an idealist world, human rights would be great value. (SurveyQ74)
There are multiple ontological stances to human rights. Donnelly (2007), in advocating 
for the relative universality of human rights, argues that although universality in terms of the 
functionality and overlapping legal consensus on human rights can be defended, ontological 
and anthropological universality remains an empirical, philosophical and political impossibility. 
For Ranciere (2004) there are two forms of rights. Firstly, written rights describing all 
humans as free and equal in for example, documents such as the UDHR (1948). Written rights 
express the abstract ideal that all members of the human family have the inalienable right to 
freedom, dignity, equality, justice and peace. These written rights assume the possibilities 
of the existence and non-existence of human rights (Ranciere, 2004). While the first form of 
rights includes the (non)existence of human rights, the second form of rights is concerned with 
human action and creativity within the intersection of (non)existing human rights. It alludes to 
those (humans) who decide to “use” their rights by constructing dissensus (ibid).
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Scholars such as Stenner (2011), Parekh (2007) and Dembour (2010) attempted to 
explore the ways people make sense of human rights. Stenner (2011) explored subjective 
understandings of human rights and concluded that ‘ordinary people’ understand human rights 
as grounded universals, radical political action, socio­political constructions and agreements 
balanced against responsibilities. Parekh (2007) and Dembour (2010) used human rights 
academic literature to explore ontological stances on human rights. Parekh (2007) explores 
Arendt’s notion of human rights (that human rights are the conditions making human life 
possible [Parekh, 2007]) in relation to essentialist and anti­essentialist groundings of human 
rights. Essentialist groundings concern the notion that human rights are related to essential 
features of human beings or morality. Anti­essentialist groundings have a refusal to employ 
metaphysical principles to human rights in common – human rights are based on affective, 
pragmatist and/or communal interests (Parekh, 2007). 
In exploring the question: what are human rights? Dembour (2010: 2) works on the 
assumption that “different people hold different concepts of human rights”. She groups 
academic writings on human rights into four schools of thought: the natural school, the 
deliberative school, the protest school and the discourse school (Dembour, 2010). The typology 
of the four schools of thought on human rights should not be regarded as fixed categories but 
rather as identifications of connections and intersections among broad orientations to human 
rights. Scholars such as Simmonds (2014), Verster (2014), Becker (2013) and Baja (2011) 
have explored the possible implications for HRE and human rights in education because of 
Dembour’s (2010) typology. Baja (2011) for example, uses Dembour’s typology to position 
three ideological approaches to HRE. Although Dembour (2010) has human rights critiques 
in mind, Baja (2011) orientates her three ideological orientations (HRE for global citizenship, 
HRE for co-existence and HRE for transformative action) as fluctuating around fixed human 
rights universals as reference point (Keet, 2015, Becker, De Wet & van Vollenhoven, 2015). 
In this article, Dembour’s categories and its possibilities are used as a point of departure 
in the search for intersecting spaces of human rights critique in which humans can act and 
dissensus can be constructed (Ranciere, 2004; Parekh, 2007). 
We pose the following research questions: What possibilities do various ontological 
stances on human rights hold for the construction of dissensus? How do these influence 
HRE in South Africa? Our aim is to show how contending ontologies see (non)existing human 
rights and what they could contribute to constructing points of dissensus in order to facilitate 
reconciliation within post-conflict education contexts. We argue that the possibilities of 
human rights lie within intersecting ontological spaces where dissensus could be constructed 
(Ranciere, 2004; Žiźek, 2005). Within such spaces, human rights and HRE can be an object 
of discussion among ‘everyone, everywhere’. Human rights and HRE can be renewed 
within political, social and educational spaces by continually formulating, claiming, rejecting, 
amending and recognising human rights anew (Azoulay, 2014). 
2. Theoretical underpinnings
Central to ontological explorations of human rights and the identification of possibilities for 
structuring dissensus, is the possession paradox of human rights. The universal and abstract 
nature of human rights described in the UDHR (1948), (which acts as a blueprint for HRE 
[Keet, 2015]) is based on the premise that all humans have human rights by virtue of being 
human and that all humans are equally and unalterably human (Donnelly, 2007). This 
however, only indicates that if human rights exist or are accepted within certain contexts then 
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those humans share human rights equally (Donnelly, 2007). However, the statement that all 
members of the human race are free and equal is paradoxical (Donnelly, 2013; Dembour, 
2010). Donnelly (2013) argues that having a right is of greatest value when one does not have 
it. The paradox is that one can ‘have’; and ‘not have’ (enjoy) a right at the same time. Ranciere 
(2004: 302) explains this paradox when posing that human rights are held by all humans (the 
subjects of rights) “who have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have 
not”. Although, for example, all human beings might be included in abstract rights, the subjects 
of human rights are continually being constituted and separated by means of in(ex)clusions in 
the global sphere of capitalism, imperialism and neo­colonialism (Becker & Du Preez, 2016; 
Žiźek, 2014; Zizek, 2005; Ranciere, 2004). The possession paradox of human rights exposes 
the intersecting spaces of (non)existing rights in which possibilities for human action and 
dissensus present itself. 
In the aftermath of World War II, there was strong interest in identifying principles that 
would protect individual human rights. One result was the drafting of the UDHR (1948) based 
on the natural rights theory. A natural law approach to human rights contends that a legal 
system can only be effective if it meets the demands of values that have eternal and universal 
aspects: “[it] can be viewed as an attempt to work out the principles that might reconcile the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in law” (Shestack, 2006: 5). Scholars from the natural and deliberative 
schools rely on principles of law to define human rights and to address the possession 
paradox; the natural school looks to positive law and the deliberative school to constitutional 
law (Dembour, 2010). In discussing ontological questions, scholars of the natural school 
argue that human rights are ‘obvious’ and exist as law (Donnelly, 2013). Scholars from 
the deliberative school, on the other hand, argue that human rights are the consensually 
agreed upon political principles expressed in constitutions (Dembour, 2010). Although the 
deliberative school like the natural school grounds human rights in law, it regards human 
rights as agreed upon, providing a political, global and local ‘code of conduct’ (ibid). 
The natural school argues that natural rights influence conventional human rights norms 
and documents and affirm the core principles of human rights. The notion of natural rights 
does however not clarify what constitutes human rights and how many rights there are/
could be. The inability of abstract, universal and natural rights to translate into substantive 
rights highlights the possession paradox of human rights. The illusion that abstract rights 
translate into changed social realities furthermore aids the distrust in human rights and HRE 
(Keet, 2015; Becker & Du Preez, 2016). An alternative would be to define human rights 
as ‘invented’ – as political decisions, customs and conventions (Law, 2007). Those in the 
deliberative school argue that global justice requires a system of international human 
rights law. They draw on the principles of the social contract as conceptualised by Rawls 
(Shestack, 2006). These are that equally positioned humans with respect for power and 
freedom come together and through dialogue reach consensus on matters of justice and 
human rights (ibid). Consensus remains relevant and beneficial to many contexts but in post-
conflict contexts, such as South Africa, the possibilities of equally positioned humans are 
limited. Ranciere (2004: 306) cautions that consensus (especially in unequal power relations) 
means “closing the spaces of dissensus” and that in reaching consensus, the abstract rights 
of all who “do not have rights while they have rights” are tentatively and temporarily turned 
into real rights (ibid). Dissensus is relegated to being a consensual process in which rights 
are distributed and each part of the social body obtains the best that it can hope for (ibid).
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Dissensus is constructed when humans act, as the subjects of human rights, on the 
given. A dissensus is not a conflict of interest, values or opinions; it is a reaction on what is 
given (Ranciere, 2004). It is the decisions and actions of humans related to an inherent (non)
existence of human rights within the framework of written human rights. Within the intersecting 
spaces of the ideals of abstract rights and the non­existence thereof in social reality, humans 
choose to use their rights. They take what is assumed to be given or assumed to be “what they 
are” (Keet, 2015) and continually create and re­create human rights. Those who fall into the 
protest school view ontological questions from a socio­historic and a struggle perspective in 
which human rights are defined as the aspirations of the oppressed (Dembour, 2010). Heyns 
(2006) argues that human rights and legitimate resistance such as acting and reacting in 
intersecting spaces of (non)existing human rights can be seen as the flipsides of a coin. He 
refers to this as the ‘struggle approach’ to human rights, captured in the expression human 
rights/legitimate resistance (ibid).
For scholars in the protest school, a struggle approach to human rights is intimately tied 
to the historical development of the ideals of human rights. They argue that human rights 
should exist and that they should be embodied in the continual and historical fight for the rights 
of the oppressed (Dembour, 2010). The political affirmation of human rights in the UDHR 
(1948) did not result in a peaceful post­historic world characterised by global democracy, as 
was the hope. As Ranciere (2004: 297) argues, “the territory of ‘posthistorical’ and peaceful 
humanity proved to be the territory of new figures of the Inhuman”. History cannot provide a 
full account of the validation and ontologies of human rights. A single authoritative account or 
interpretation is not possible. The historical perspectives that we have, merely capture what 
human rights were/are at a specific time and in a specific place and space. 
We argue that although the continual critique of human rights and HRE (Keet, 2012; 
2015; Zymbalis, 2016) is of the utmost importance, the actions of humans on the given is 
crucial to the continual renewal of human rights and HRE. Acting on the given and structuring 
dissensus, Arendt (1958), Keet (2015) and Ranciere (2004) argue that this is only possible 
in political spaces. Political spaces form the intersections of “the abstract literalness of the 
rights and the polemic about their verification” (Ranciere, 2004: 308). It is important to note 
that Ranciere does not refer to NGOs or political groups who claim or use rights for others. 
The subjects of human rights act on the given and use their rights within political spaces. 
Closing social and political spaces by consensus or by interventions, for example, disable 
possibilities for dissensus and render human rights of no value. They become the rights of 
victims and the rights of those who are unable to enact their rights (Ranciere, 2004). When 
human rights are of no value they are passed on as acts of charity, “along with medicine 
and clothes”, to those who are subjected to the “inhuman” (Ranciere, 2004: 308). Human 
rights become humanitarian rights, opening up possibilities for humanitarian intervention and 
invasion (Ranciere, 2004). 
In a reaction to what they perceive as the imperialist and neo­colonial nature of humani­
tarian rights, scholars in the discourse school argue that human rights do not exist and 
are only talked about (Dembour, 2010). Discourse scholars argue that a replacement for 
human rights, as a possible emancipation project, should be searched for (Dembour, 2010). 
Neocosmos (2006) argues that humans are imprisoned by essentialist notions of human 
rights as judicial subjects/objects and passive victims. Scholars from the discourse school 
focus their critique of human rights on exclusions (within the frame of abstract rights), the 
failure to acknowledge the other, identity politics, the moral and political core of universal 
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rights and the capitalist premise of such rights (Becker & Du Preez, 2016; Zembylas & 
Bozalek, 2014; Cistelecan, 2011; Žižek, 2005; Rancière, 2004). Kapur (2006) argues that 
normative claims, such as that human rights enable processes of progress, the assumption 
that human rights are universal and the structuring of the subject of human rights as an 
atomised, insular and liberal being, illustrate the dark side of human rights. 
We have thus far explored the typology of the four schools of thought devised by Dembour 
(2010) in relation to Ranciere’s (2004) two forms of human rights. We argue that the ontological 
stances of the natural school and the deliberative school point to the (non)existence of human 
rights: the intersection of the ideals of human rights and the non­existence thereof. Scholars 
from the natural school rely on the law to address this while those in the deliberative school 
put their faith in consensus on internationally accepted principles of human rights. Scholars 
from the protest school view human rights from a socio­historic perspective. They argue 
that human action and reaction within intersecting spaces of what human rights are (given) 
and what human rights could be, make it possible to recreate human rights continuously. 
Discourse scholars claim that when human rights become humanitarian rights within 
imperialist, capitalist and neo­colonialist frames of reference, spaces of dissensus are closed 
so no acting on the given is possible. What possibilities do these intersecting ontologies pose 
for reconciliation and HRE in South Africa?
Simmonds (2014) and Verster (2014) contend that in order to think laterally about 
human rights, HRE should embrace contending conceptual frameworks, ontological and 
epistemological stances and explore the many possibilities they present. Simmonds (2014) 
relates Dembour’s (2010) typology of the four schools of thought on human rights to the three 
dimensions of HRE proposed by the World Programme for Human Rights (2010­2014). These 
three dimensions are knowledge and skills (which Simmonds [2014: 136] relates to the natural 
school), values, beliefs and attitudes (which Simmonds [2014: 136] relates to the deliberative 
school) and action (which Simmonds [2014: 136] relates to the protest school). Keet (2015) 
however argues that human rights educators should acknowledge that the conceptual and 
pedagogical tools of dominant HRE programmes (including the World Programme for Human 
Rights [2010­2014]) cannot respond to the challenges human rights face globally. 
Keet (2015: 49) pleads for “Critical Human Rights Education” (CHRE). CHRE is premised 
on the task of education to critique the categories (the given) in which it is structured 
(Keet, 2015). He argues that CHRE should be regarded as a political activity, should be anti­
declarationist, should strive towards a new pedagogical language rooted in human wrongs 
and that it should have as a purpose the constitution of human agency illuminating the 
possibilities of action (Keet, 2015). Although we agree with Keet (2015) on the need for CHRE, 
we focus our attention on the importance of human action to renew human rights and HRE. 
Linking the essence of education as continual renewal (Arendt, 2006; Becker 2015) to the 
renewal of HRE, we argue that the essence and purpose of education and HRE are possible 
through human speech and action in moments of dissensus. In this regard, HRE specifically, 
should assume responsibility for the world and for every new generation, who as the future of 
humanity, are to renew the world by acting on the given (Arendt, 2006; Becker, 2015). 
If the essence of education (and therefore HRE) is the renewal of the world, it requires 
HRE to create a niche as “counter­hegemonic practices” in order to recreate human rights 
and HRE continuously (Keet, 2012: 22). Jansen (2009) proposes nine key elements of a post­
conflict pedagogy of which a pedagogy of dissonance seems particularly appropriate for this 
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context. Acting on the given by means of a pedagogy of dissonance requires a “commitment 
to locate, interrogate and engage” (Jansen, 2009: 267) knowledge about and experiences 
of (non)existing human rights. Within spaces of dissonance, dissensus can be constructed 
through speech and action. Human rights and HRE can be renewed by continually formulating, 
claiming, rejecting, amending and recognising human rights anew (Azoulay, 2014). 
A brief explanation of the project and data collection processes follows before selected 
data are presented and discussed. 
3. Human rights literacy: A quest for meaning 
This article forms part of the dissemination process of a NRF funded project Human rights 
literacy: A quest for meaning (Roux, 2012). The project aimed to determine the knowledge 
field of HRE in teacher education at South African faculties of education (Roux & Du Preez, 
2013). The project group collected qualitative and quantitative data using three different 
collection processes: a walk­about, a survey and small focus­group discussions (Roux & 
Du Preez, 2013; Becker, De Wet & Parker, 2014). 
The purpose of the ‘walk­about’ was to probe the understandings that under­ and 
postgraduate students (from various faculties) have of human rights. The ‘walk­about’ was 
conducted on three university campuses in two provinces. Convenience sampling was used 
to explore the domain and inform the questions developed for the survey (Gillham, 2008; 
Flick, 2009). Eighty students participated in the ‘walk­about’ (Becker et al., 2014). 
Purposive sampling (Cresswell, 2013; Pidgeon & Henwood, 2004) was used for the survey 
phase of the data collection process. Three levels of sampling were employed during this 
phase. First, three institutions were selected. Six different campuses were then chosen from 
them. These were situated in four provinces. The team referred to these as sites. This was 
done by means of stratified purposive sampling in order to illustrate subgroups and facilitate 
comparisons (Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2009). Finally, the team focused on first and final year 
pre­service teachers in teacher education programmes at the institutions in question. A total 
of n1192/4953 student teachers accessed the survey (Becker et al., 2014). 
Following the survey, small focus­group discussions were conducted on the six sites to 
validate data collected by means of the previous two collection strategies and to re­evaluate 
the literature, ontologies and epistemologies (Roux & Du Preez, 2013). The sizes of the focus 
groups varied from three to nine participants. A total of n68/1192 students were selected by 
means of snowball sampling (Cresswell, 2013; Gillham, 2008)
This article aims to explore different ontologies and the possibilities (political and social) 
they offer for structuring dissensus and facilitating reconciliation. We have therefore decided 
on a critical phenomenological approach so that we can draw on existential phenomenology 
(the nature of human rights) and critical Marxism (the possibilities for political and social 
action towards reconciliation) (Jehanson, 1984). For the purpose of this article, the qualitative 
data from the three collection processes were analysed by means of discourse analyses 
(Potter, 2004). 
The data include written (comments in survey) and spoken text (walk­about and focus 
group interview data which were digitally­recorded and transcribed verbatim). We have 
referenced the data in terms of the data source: Walk-About for responses from the ‘walk­
about’, Survey Q24 (the number indicates the question number) for qualitative data that 
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emanates from the survey and s1y4m2 for data emanating from focus­group discussions. 
For example, s1y4m2 refers to data from a focus group at site 1(s1), fourth years (y4) second 
meeting (m2).
4. Lived experiences and idealistic expectations
Firstly, all qualitative data were read holistically. The next step was to select and analyse data 
excerpts pertaining to various ontological stances, the possession paradox and the possibilities 
of structuring dissensus. A student teacher from site 5 described various ontological stances 
to human rights as follows, 
It’s like people tend to use the word human rights but without knowing what is/are human 
rights. You say I’ve got a right and I’m a human being but what is human rights? Let’s 
start from there how would you define human rights? If you were to ask me what is 
human rights and then someone else we will all have different views on what are human 
rights (s5y1m1).
During the first focus group discussions 34 of the 68 student teachers (50%) at all six sites 
qualified their yes answer to the question whether human rights exist, indicating that they were 
aware of the possession paradox of human rights: 
It is [human rights] we don’t know, not a reality to us, it is like a book that is on a shelf 
but we have never opened the book and seen the book and touched the book (s5y1m1).
It does exist but I feel at a certain level. Some children do not have the right to go to 
school. At some schools like in rural areas children do not have the right to go to school or 
they do not have money to help them to go to school or like shelter. There is no funding. 
Sometimes the houses are not properly built – people get sick easily and stuff. So I feel it 
is existing but it’s not… (s1y1m1).
…in the rural areas – those people – there are certain rights that must be obtained, 
actually, that they are having, but those people that are in power they do not respect their 
rights… (s6y1m1).
These student teachers agree that human rights exist but then qualify their answers by 
pointing to their experiences of human rights as, “like a book on a shelf; So I feel it is existing 
but it’s not”. In the second excerpt, the word but is used to express the conflict related to the 
(non)existence of human rights. 
In trying to make sense of the possession paradox, some student teachers took a nihilistic 
stance to human rights similar to that of scholars from the discourse school (Dembour, 2010). 
The following excerpts illustrate this. 
My problem is, it is all sweet words like human rights and those things, like human rights 
and democracy, it is a lot of sweet words, but many times it is only words (s3y4m2).
It is a way of the government to control people as people but they put it in a way as if they 
are helping us. Most of the times they use human rights against us (Walk-About).
The second comment expressed the view that human rights mask and structure relations 
of power in which humans remain objects, passive and powerless. The student teacher used 
phrases such as to “control people as people” to describe relations in which humans remain 
victims. The masking of such relations within human rights discourse is reflected in “they put 
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it in a way as if they are helping us. Most of the times they use human rights against us.” The 
first comment relates to the discourse school’s perception of human rights as only ‘spoken 
about’ (Dembour 2010: 11): “all sweet words; but many times it is only sweet words”. 
In trying to understand and/or solve the possession paradox, some student teachers look 
to the law, the constitution and/or the government. 
They [human rights] do exist – like in the Constitution it states that as long as you are a 
human being you have rights (s1y4m1).
Because people have rights – human rights are in our constitution… (s6y4m1).
Laws or aspects that protect each and every individual in a country to make that particular 
person a free and responsible person (SurveyQ12).
These comments allude to the understandings of human rights embodied in the constitution 
and the law. These student teachers seem to align themselves with the natural and deliberative 
schools (Dembour, 2010). They regard human rights as given, “because people have rights; 
as long as you are a human being you have rights”. It seems that they see the constitution, 
“like in the Constitution it states…” and the law, “Laws or aspects that protect each and every 
individual in a country” as holding the solution to the possession paradox.
Other participants regarded the government as the source of human rights and the 
protector of human rights.
And also politicians what are they doing to enforce these rights because yes in schools, 
as she said life orientation teachers you a little bit, it’s a little bit, an inch, you know of the 
rights and how they are listed and labelled. But what is our government doing because 
rights came from them. We feel that is the source of it, what are they doing because at 
election time, yes they are all about the rights…if you lack education there is no way you 
are going to do something about that… (s5y1m1).
I think it does exist however the rights of people are violated like women their rights to 
life, are violated, especially in abusive relations and if they report it nothing is done. So 
it does exist but it’s violated. And the government is not doing much about it (s1y1m1).
…The government must make sure that everyone has proper education, proper medical 
care, proper housing (s1y1m1).
Comments such as “But what is our government doing because rights came from them” 
and “the government must make sure” might stem from understandings gained from a socio­
historic perspective of human rights. Student teachers link the existence and validity of human 
rights to the birth of democracy in 1994. 
I think of the struggle, the tragic things that Nelson Mandela and the rest of the 
underprivileged nation in the apartheid era had to go through to get equal rights and to be 
free in a democratic land (Survey Q12).
I have experienced human rights because like referring to what we have been told about 
the earlier years before 1994 and seeing that time and comparing it with this time it is 
very different… (s1y1m1).
These two excerpts move from phrases depicting oppression (struggle, tragic things, 
underprivileged nation, had to go through) to a utopian notion (get equal rights and to be free 
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in a democratic land). Defining human rights in terms of socio-historic perceptions that seem to 
be aligned with the protest school is reflected in phrases such as “seeing that time; comparing 
it with this time; the struggle; the things that Nelson Mandela and the under­privileged nation 
in the apartheid era had to go through”. The reference to “get equal rights and to be free in 
a democratic land” refers to written rights inscribed in The Constitution of South Africa and 
The Bill of Rights (1996) post­1994. 
It seems that student teachers are not optimistic about the possibilities of structuring 
dissensus or about people in South Africa using their rights. Student teachers argue that 
“people don’t know their rights, they are powerless” and that people “are not aware of the fact” 
that they have rights that they should use: 
Because I feel it is limited in the sense that as human beings we don’t know that we have 
these rights. We don’t know what rights are in order for us to express our rights or love 
our rights (s5y1m1).
…but people are sometimes not aware of the fact, I mean, the kind of rights they have 
(s2y1m1).
It’s governed by a monetary basis because people with power and money they stand up 
quickly and say I know this right but people that don’t have money they are like scared 
to say I have this right to education, I have you know, they don’t take the power because 
they are actually powerless (s5y1m1).
Student teachers argue that there is a lack of knowledge on human rights: “not aware 
of the fact; we don’t know that we have these rights; we don’t know what rights are”. They 
also argue that a divide exists between those who have money and those who do not. The 
former readily lay claim to their rights, while the latter are “like scared to say I have this right; 
It’s governed by a monetary basis”. These factors add to the (im)possibilities for structuring 
dissensus within intersecting spaces of (non)existing rights.
5. Discussion
The preamble of the UDHR (1948) which speaks of “the recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” is echoed in the 
comments of student teachers who take the view that human rights are given and grounded in 
law (s1y4m1; s6y4m1; SurveyQ12). From the data, however, it seems that student teachers 
are trying to make sense of what human rights are and could be and whether human rights 
exist (s5y1m1). During the first focus group discussion, fifty per cent of student teachers from 
all six sites indicated that they were aware of the possession paradox of human rights. 
Student teachers stressed a lack of knowledge about human rights (s5y1m1; s2y1m1). 
Knowledge of what human rights are/could be is a pre­condition for structuring dissensus. A 
critical and dialogical approach in the classroom is necessary when teaching­learning human 
rights. Du Preez (2012) argues that research conducted between 2005 and 2011 indicates 
that the teaching of human rights was monological and uncritical, thus disregarding the spirit 
of a participatory democracy and the possibilities for structuring dissensus. Such teaching 
methods bring one question to the fore: how much learning actually takes place regarding 
human rights (Du Preez, 2012). The student teachers are of the opinion that not much learning 
regarding human rights occurs (s5y1m1).
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In our view, understandings based on a socio­historic and struggle perspectives of human 
rights in the South African context inhibit possibilities for structuring dissensus. The snapshot 
images of history (Survey Q12; s1y1m1) may lead to assumptions that human rights post­
1994 are given, fixed and static – as the comments that prompted this exploration indicate. 
The perception that the government are the givers and protectors of human rights (s5y1m1; 
s1y1m1) presents barriers to structuring dissensus. Student teachers argue that the struggle 
(pre­1994) resulted in human rights and as the government is the source of human rights, the 
government is responsible for enabling citizens to use their rights (s5y1m1; s1y1m1). Such 
perceptions disable the constitution of agency and the possibilities of political action relating 
to human rights (Keet, 2015).
Waiting for government to bestow substantive rights on its citizens often leads to the 
structuring of power relations masked by universal and declarational human rights discourse 
(Walk­About; Keet, 2012). When the subjects of human rights do not use their rights, human 
rights become humanitarian rights in the form of charity dispensed to the poor, women, children 
and the elderly in rural areas by government and/or NGOs (s1y1m1) (Ranciere, 2004). 
The closing of spaces in which dissensus can be structured by means of consensus or 
humanitarian rights can only be detrimental to a sustainable democracy and reconciliation. 
In order to enable speech, action and dissensus in political spaces, educators should 
acknowledge that declarationist pedagogies have very limited disruptive capacities 
(Keet, 2015). The possibilities of human rights and HRE lie within the intersecting spaces of 
(non)existing human rights. In post-conflict societies such as South Africa, dissensus present 
possibilities for new ways of co­existing and (re)conciliation when the subjects of human rights 
choose to use their rights. The first step would be to restructure the South African curriculum 
by introducing a participatory and critical approach to teaching­learning human rights, which 
student teachers confessed to know little about (s1y1m1; s5y1m1). Dissonance, Jansen 
(2009) argues, becomes possible when the curriculum includes multiple knowledges (in this 
instance multiple ontologies of human rights) within a social justice framework. This would 
facilitate dialogue, discussion and critique of the given and encourage teaching­learning 
towards developing possibilities of structuring dissensus so that critical citizens use their 
rights towards reconciliation. 
6. Conclusion
The comments from the student teachers that prompted this exploration point to the 
possession paradox of human rights, or, as Ranciere (2004) argues, the first form of rights. 
What human rights are and could be, the realistic and idealistic nature of human rights, are 
inherent to the nature of human rights. This implies that HRE should be a continual dissonant 
process, enabling moments of dissensus within intersecting spaces of (non)existing rights. 
It is a process in which humans act, interact and react on the given in recreating human 
rights and HRE when they choose to use their rights. The implications and possibilities for 
reconciliation in post-conflict educational contexts thereof are multiple. 
Acting on the given and structuring dissensus requires a participatory and critical approach 
to teaching-learning human rights. In post-conflict educational contexts, it also requires a 
pedagogy of dissonance made possible by the inclusion of multiple ontologies of human rights 
within a social justice framework (Jansen, 2009). This would facilitate dialogue, discussion and 
critique on the given and actively teach­learn towards possibilities of structuring dissensus so 
that critical citizens use their rights and move towards reconciliation. 
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